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This paper uses panel data from a sample of Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
countries over the 1960–96 period and both Instrumental Variables (IV)
and dynamic panel data (DPD98) estimator to investigate the effect of the
incidence and severity of civil war on the growth rate of per capita income.
We find that both factors have a robust, negative and statistically
significant effect on the growth rate of per capita income. We find that civil
war affects the growth rate of income partly through reduced investment in
physical capital. However, if one does not control for the correlation
between civil war incidence and other growth factors, the estimated effect of
civil war on economic growth is not robust. We are unable to find any
significant relationship between the level of income and the incidence of
civil war in SSA countries after controlling for other variables that are
correlated with income levels.
1. Introduction
This paper uses panel data from a sample of Sub-Saharan African
(SSA) countries during the 1960–96 period and both Instrumental
Variables (IV) and Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) estimation method-
ologies to investigate the effects of civil war on the growth rate of
per capita income. We do so by estimating a growth equation that
includes the incidence and severity of civil war as additional
regressors. We also investigate one of several possible mechanisms
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through which civil war incidence affects the growth rate of income
as well as the effect of civil war incidence on the level of per capita
income. The distinguishing feature of our study is that we
instrument for the incidence of civil war to get around the possible
endogeneity of civil war incidence. We employ two different
measures of civil war in this study, thus increasing confidence in
our results. We focus on SSA because of the combination of a large
number of civil wars and poor economic performance on the
continent, since decolonisation in the 1960s. In spite of the observed
co-movement of civil wars and poor economic performance, studies
of economic growth in SSA countries have not investigated the
effects of civil war on economic growth. Most empirical growth
studies have focused on the effects of other variables on economic
growth in Africa, using civil war incidence only as a conditioning
variable, if at all.
The economic performance of SSA over the last three decades has
been abysmal, leading some observers to refer to this growth
performance as a ‘tragedy’ (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Atardi and
Sala-i-Martin, 2003). SSA is the only part of the developing world
where per capita income and living standards have declined over
the period. The deteriorating living standards have been
accompanied by an increase in the incidence of civil wars; about
20 SSA countries have experienced at least one period of civil war
since the attainment of independence in the 1960s. Indeed, some
SSA countries (e.g., Angola, Mozambique, Sudan) have hardly had
any period without civil war since they attained independence.
Even SSA countries that were considered islands of stability in the
1970s, such as Coˆte d’Ivoire and Liberia, did not escape the
incidence of civil wars at the turn of the twentieth century. While
civil wars have declined in other parts of the world, the incidence
and intensity of civil wars have increased in this region. Of the 27
active armed conflicts going on around the world in 1999, about
41% of them were civil wars taking place in SSA, a region with less
than 11% of the world’s population (SIPRI, 2000).2
Empirical research on the growth impact of civil war incidence
has yielded mixed results. While some researchers find negative
effects, others do not find any significant effect. Levine and Renelt
(1991) find that the effect of civil war on the growth rate of per capita
2 See SIPRI Yearbook, 2000 (Oxford).
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income is not robust; the sign, magnitude and statistical significance
of the civil war dummy variable changes with conditioning
variables. Part of the inconclusiveness of the results may stem
from the fact that some of the variables that cause civil wars, such as
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, primary commodity dependence
and low stocks of human capital, are also determinants of income
growth. Indeed, the economics of civil war literature suggests that
the incidence of civil war is partly explained by income growth as
well as variables that determine income growth, making the
incidence of civil war a potentially endogenous variable in an
income growth equation.
Does the incidence of civil war have any negative effect on the
growth rate of per capita income in SSA countries? Is this effect
independent of the underlying socio-economic factors that cause
civil war? Is this effect a permanent one? These are some of the
issues we investigate in this study. The ‘new’ growth literature
suggests that state failure generally has deleterious effect on
economic growth (Barro, 1991; Easterly et al., 1993; Barro and Lee,
1994; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Gyimah-Brem-
pong and Traynor, 1999; Murdock and Sandler, 2002). We view the
incidence of civil war as a manifestation of state failure in the sense
of inability to peacefully mediate and resolve conflicts. As indicated
above, the economics of civil war literature suggests that civil wars
have economic as well as non-economic causes and consequences.
In particular, high unemployment rate, primary export dependency,
low human capital stock, slow economic growth, and weak and
ineffective central authority stemming from poor fiscal conditions
have been suggested as possible causes of the incidence of civil war.
The findings of the two strands of research suggest the possibility
that cross-country differences in the growth rate of income and the
propensity for civil war are driven by common factors. For example,
Nigeria and Gabon are oil exporting SSA countries with divergent
growth paths. Nigeria has experienced slow income growth, civil
war and political instability, while Gabon has experienced
respectable income growth, no civil war and a relatively long
period of what passes for political stability in SSA. Is it possible
that Nigeria’s slow growth is due to the high degree of ethno-
linguistic and religious fractionalization, low human capital stock
and weak central government that result in a high propensity for
civil war?
272 K. Gyimah-Brempong, M.E. Corley
The usual approach to investigating the impact of civil war on
economic growth is to include a dummy variable for the incidence
of a civil war and interpret the coefficient of this variable as the
growth effect of a civil war (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The
coefficient of a civil war dummy variable cannot distinguish
between the growth effects of civil war and unobserved country
characteristics that explain the propensity for civil war. In the
Nigeria/Gabon example, the civil war dummy cannot distinguish
between the growth effects of ethnic fractionalisation, which retards
economic growth and may cause civil war, and the growth effect of
the occurrence of civil war itself. It is not clear whether the growth
rate of Nigeria would be higher had it not actually had a civil war. It
is therefore necessary to account for the possible endogeneity of
civil war incidence if researchers are to properly identify the growth
impact of civil war incidence.3
The economics of civil war literature gets around this endogene-
ity problem by lagging the growth rate of income in the probability
of civil war equation. If, in addition to initiation, civil war is
sustained by poor economic performance, then economic growth is
likely to be an endogenous variable in the incidence of civil war.
Moreover, as indicated above, most of the variables used to explain
the incidence of civil war are themselves explanatory variables m
the income growth equation. Furthermore, these variables change
very slowly over time, hence they are likely to be correlated with
income growth and civil war incidence with long lags. The result is
that it is not easy to isolate the growth impact of civil war incidence
with a simple dummy variable approach. We account for this
unmeasured endogeneity of civil war incidence in our study.
Table 1 presents some comparative statistics of growth variables
for a sample of SSA countries during our sample period. The data
show that countries that experienced civil war during the sample
period have average per capita incomes that are 50% lower than
countries that experienced no civil wars. Investment/GDP ratios
and stocks of education human capital in civil war countries are at
least 50% lower than the average for countries that had no civil war.
The civil war group of countries are also more primary export
dependent, have fewer civil liberties and less effective legislatures,
and experience higher rates of inflation than their counterparts with
3 We use the term civil war incidence to refer to initiation and duration of a civil
war.
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no civil wars. The upshot is that countries that had civil war(s) have
lower endowments of growth enhancing characteristics than the
countries that did not have civil war. Not surprisingly, the
unweighted average growth rate of per capita income in the civil
war countries during the sample period was 0.36%, compared with
1.16% for the non civil war countries. Can the cross-national
differences in income growth rate be explained by differences in
observed ‘traditional’ growth factors alone? If the answer is yes,
then the coefficient of the civil war variable should be zero, once a
researcher accounts for all observable growth variables in a cross
country growth equation.
The approach we use to overcome the endogeneity problem is as
follows: we use a one-period lead of the predicted probability of
civil war as an instrument for the incidence of civil war. Our
rationale for using this instrument is that the probability of a civil
war is a function of underlying socio-economic factors that are
highly persistent over time, making current civil war propensity
highly correlated with future civil war propensity, which in turn
will be highly correlated with the actual incidence of civil war in
Table 1: Comparative statistics
No civil war Civil war
Variable Meana Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
_y 1.1604 5.2396 -0.3568 4.5167
y (87 PPP $) 1224.09 1004.37 786.04 292.71
govcon (%) 22.754 8.586 22.845 7.2065
k (%) 11.868 7.4881 6.3819 5.6789
edu 2.381 1.323 1.4658 0.6763
trgdp 0.0249 0.0113 0.0249 0.0114
civ 0.389 0.1862 0.1762 0.2813
legef fct 2.078 0.498 1.021 1.809
primary (%) 15.577 10.579 19.1416 11.8027
inflation rate (%) 13.4568 16.882 108.413 713.439
N 176 44
a Unweighted averages.
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the current period. However, because the one-period lead propen-
sity for civil war is a future value, it is not correlated with the error
term of the growth equation in the current period.
Investigating the effects of civil war on economic growth in SSA is
an important policy issue. If the incidence of civil war has a
significantly negative impact on the growth rate of income, then
efforts should be made, including the establishment of regional
institutions to maintain peace, to prevent the incidence of civil wars
as one way of increasing economic growth rate in SSA countries.
If civil war is found to have a short-term growth effect but no long-
term effect on income levels, then from an economic policy point of
view, the quest to end or avoid civil wars is only based on inter-
temporal substitution of current for future income growth. On the
other hand, if we find that civil wars have long-term impact on the
level of income, then there will be economic reasons to find an end
to or to avoid civil wars. If there is no robust negative growth effect
of civil war incidence, then the quest to end civil wars in SSA should
be justified on moral, political and humanitarian, rather than
economic grounds.
We find that civil war incidence has a negative, statistically
significant and robust effect on the growth rate of per capita
income in SSA. The negative growth effect is, however, robust
only if we account for possible endogeneity of civil war
incidence. In addition to the direct negative effect, we also find
that one of the mechanisms through which civil war incidence
decreases the growth rate of income is decreased investment in
physical capital. We are, however, unable to find any significant
effect of civil war incidence on the level of per capita income
after accounting for other factors that are correlated with the
level of income. We also find that the severity of civil war has a
negative growth effect apart from the growth effect of civil war
incidence. Our results are quite robust to the measures of civil
war, the measure of income and the method of accounting for the
endogeneity of civil war incidence in estimation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly
reviews the recent empirical literature on the relationship between
civil war and economic growth. Section 3 introduces the econo-
metric model used to investigate the relationship between economic
growth and civil war incidence, and discusses the estimation
methodology, while Section 4 discusses the data used for the study.
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Section 5 presents and discusses the statistical results and draws
some policy conclusions. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
The growth empirics literature has been growing exponentially
during the last decade.4 Because the literature is vast, we briefly
mention only a few of the studies that include civil war as an
explanatory variable. Barro and Lee (1994) and Caselli et al. (1996)
find no significant growth impact of civil war. Easterly et al. (1993)
find no statistically significant relationship between war casualties
and growth rate. Barro (1991), Sachs and Warner (1997) and
Sala-i-Martin (1997) find a significantly negative growth effect of
civil war. Easterly and Levine (1997) point to ethnic conflicts,
including ethnic wars, as a major source of Africa’s poor economic
performance. Ritsen et al. (2000) develop a model in which lack of
social cohesion leads to conflict and war, which in turn leads to
reduction in growth rates of per capita income. Rodrik (1999),
although not directly addressing civil war, argues that the failure of
some developing countries to recover from external shocks in the
1980s can be attributed to ethnic conflicts. The problem, he argues, is
not ethnic or religious fractionalisation so much as the failure to
develop institutions to mediate conflicts that arise in any society.
Atardi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) conclude that civil conflict
decreased the average annual growth rate of GDP in SSA by 0.5
percentage points in the second half of the twentieth century. With
the exception of Atardi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), none of these
studies was primarily interested in investigating the impact of civil
war on income growth; they only used civil war as a conditioning
variable.
Murdoch and Sandler (2002) is the first study we know of that
investigates the effects of civil war on income growth. Using the
augmented neoclassical growth model of Mankiw et al. (1992), with
civil war incidence and intensity as added regressors, the paper
finds that civil war incidence has a statistically significant negative
impact on the levels of per capita income and substantially negative
impact on the growth rates of per capita income in a country and
those of neighbouring countries. The paper also finds that civil war
4 See Temple (1999) and Durlauf and Quah (1999) for reviews of the “new” growth
literature.
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intensity, as measured by war deaths, affects economic growth
negatively; the greater the intensity of the conflict, the greater the
spatial spill-over effects. In addition, the paper finds that the impact
of civil war on income is short-term in nature. We note that the
paper treats civil war as an exogenous variable.
The economics of civil war literature, ‘launched’ by Collier and
Hoeffler (1998), casts the causes of civil wars in terms of utility
maximisation: rebels will initiate a civil war if the expected benefits
of rebellion exceed the costs. Using civil war data during the 1960–
92 period and probit and tobit analyses, they find that ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation, initial income, dependence on natural
resource exports and population size are strong determinants of the
probability of the incidence of civil war. In subsequent work, Collier
and Hoeffler (2002) and Collier (2000, 2002) expand the economic
causes of civil war using both theoretical and empirical analyses of
the initiation and duration of civil war. Of particular interest to our
paper, they find that lagged economic growth, low income,
availability of a large number of unskilled unemployed young
men and primary export dependency are important economic
determinants of the initiation and duration of civil wars, besides
political and ethno-linguistic variables.
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000, 2002) apply a variant of the
Collier–Hoeffler model to African data. Defining the incidence of
civil war as the sum of the probability of war initiation in a period
given the presence of peace in the previous period and the
probability of war in a period given the presence of war in the
previous period, they confirm the Collier–Hoeffler thesis of civil
war incidence. However, they find that lagged income growth rate
is not a significant predictor of civil war incidence. Miguel et al.
(2004) use an IV approach to investigate the effects of economic
performance on the incidence of civil war in SSA countries. Using
variation in rainfall as an instrument for economic growth, the
paper finds that economic growth has a large, statistically
significant negative impact on the probality of a civil war.
Furthermore, the paper finds that once one controls for the growth
of income, the probability of civil war is not influenced by other
variables, such as democracy and geography, that are not important
determinants of civil war incidence.
There have been some important contributions to the civil war
literature by political scientists recently. Fearon (2001), using more
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comprehensive civil war data, finds that once one accounts for the
level of income and geography, other variables are not significant
predictors of the probability of the initiation or duration of civil
wars. Fearon and Laitin (2003), in a comprehensive study of the
relationship between ethnicity, insurgency and civil wars, con-
cludes that the risk of civil war in a country is influenced by poverty,
political instability, rough terrain and large populations. They argue
that once one accounts for these factors, ethnic or religious
fractionalisation has no significant impact on the risk of civil war
incidence. Dudley and Miller (1998) evaluate four theories of civil
war incidence and find strong support for the economic model of
civil war. The economic determinants of civil war indicates that
lagged economic growth and some socio-cultural variables that
determine economic growth are important determinants of the
incidence of civil war, suggesting that civil war may be an
endogenous variable in growth equations. The results of the civil
war studies suggest that factors that lead to the initiation of civil
wars are, generally, different from those that sustain civil wars.
3. Model
3.1. Growth Rate Equation
Civil war can affect economic growth through several channels. It is
likely to decrease the stock of physical capital through destruction
of infrastructure, as well as reduction in investment in capital as a
result of capital flight, reduced savings and increased uncertainty.
Increased uncertainty is also likely to decrease the inflow of foreign
direct investment (FDI). In the same way, the stock of human capital
can be decreased by civil war as people are killed, educated and
skilled people emigrate, and fewer people are trained as resources
are diverted to fight the war. A civil war, especially an ethnically
based one, is likely to destroy social capital and social and political
institutions that are necessary to mobilise and utilise resources for
economic growth. In addition to decreased resource accumulation,
civil war can directly disrupt the employment of existing resources,
reduce production and hence economic growth. All these factors
can also lead to decreased total factor productivity, as endogenous
growth theory suggests.
We combine the insights of the growth empirics and the
economics of civil war literatures in our study. Our model is
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a growth equation formed from the two research literatures.
Following the empirical growth literature (Romer, 1986; Barro,
1991; Barro and Lee, 1994; Jones, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996; Hall and
Jones, 1999), we make the growth rate of per capita income ð_yÞ a
function of the growth rates of technology ð_aÞ; per capita physical
and human capital ð_k; _hÞ and environmental factors, including civil
wars. Because we are interested in the growth impacts of civil war,
we disaggregate the vector of environmental variables into civil war
(civwar) and all other environmental variables (Z). The per capita
income growth function is given as:
_y ¼ _yð_a; _k; _h; civwar;ZÞ ›y=›a; ›y=›k; ›y=›h $ 0
›y=›civwar # 0
ð1Þ
where all variables are as defined in the text above.
The specific functional form of the growth equation we estimate
follows those of earlier researchers (e.g. Feder, 1983; Barro, 1991;
Mankiw et al., 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Edwards, 1998).We
write the growth rate of per capita income as a linear function of
investment/GDP ratio (k), the stock of human capital (h), govern-
ment consumption (govcon) as a proxy for economic policy,
openness of the economy (trgdp), initial income (y0) and civwar.
The equation we estimate is given as:
_yit ¼ a0 þ a1kit þ a2eduit þ a3y0;it þ a4govconit þ a5trgdpit
þ a6civwarit þ 1it
ð2Þ
where edu is education, which we use a proxy for human capital, 1it
is a stochastic error term and all other variables are as defined in the
text above. We expect the coefficients of k, trgdp and edu to be
positive, while those of gov and civwar are expected to be negative.
If conditional convergence operates in African countries, we expect
the coefficient of y0 to be negative.
3.2. Estimation Method
The growth equation is estimated with panel data from a sample of
SSA countries. If there is no correlation between the error term and
any of the regressors, then the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random
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Effects (RE) estimators will produce consistent estimates; otherwise
they will not. Table 1 suggests that the propensity to have a civil war
is correlated with some of the variables that determine the growth
rate of per capita income. The correlation may be causal or it may
not; both sets of variables may be influenced by a third set of factors.
This situation may reflect unobserved endogeneity of the civil war
variable in the growth rate equation. The possible endogeneity of
civwar in the growth equation implies that estimating the equation
directly with either as FE or RE estimator will produce biased, and
possibly inconsistent, estimates. One possible way to resolve this
problem is to estimate structural equations. However, because there
are so many variables that affect the growth rate of countries, a
structural equations model becomes very complex to estimate.
In African countries, where data are sparse and have dubious
quality, this could lead to estimates that are, at best, of little validity.
Alternatively, one could use an IV estimator to estimate the
growth equation as in Sachs and Warner (1997) or the Dynamic
Panel Data (DPD) estimator, a General Method of Moments (GMM)
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), as used by Caselli
et al. (1996). If all regressors are strictly exogenous, the DPD, IV, FE
and RE estimators will produce consistent estimates, but only
estimates from the latter two are efficient. The DPD estimator uses
lagged endogenous variables and current values of exogenous
variables as instruments in estimation. It will produce valid and
consistent estimates if and only if the error terms are not
autocorrelated. We consider endogenous regressors as predeter-
mined for vi:tþ2 but not for vit, thus allowing us to use all xt up to xt21
as valid instruments x^it: The linear moment restriction implied by
the growth equation is
E½ðDyit 2 DX~0i;t21QÞXi;t2j ¼ 0 for j ¼ 2; …t2 1
where X0 ¼ ðyt21; XÞ is the vector of lagged endogenous and strictly
exogenous regressors. Given our argument that the factors that
determine the incidence of civil war are highly persistent over time,
the lagged values of civil war incidence are likely to be correlated
with the error term of the growth equation in the current period.
This makes the usual DPD estimator inappropriate for our
purposes. However, Arellano and Bond (1991) have developed a
new version of the estimator (DPD98) that allows one to use future
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values of a variable as an instrument for estimation. In addition to
the IV estimator, we present estimates of the growth equation based
on the DPD98 estimator. Arellano and Bond present two estima-
tors—the one- and two-step estimators. As is the usual practice, we
present the two-step estimator but base statistical inference on the
one-step estimator.
The IV estimates uses the one period lead of the predicted value
of the probability of civil war incidence ( pcivwartþ1) as a regressor.
Because this regressor is a predicted regressor, it is not fixed but
stochastic, with its own probability distribution. Failure to account
for the stochastic nature of this regressor in the estimation of the
covariance matrix of the second-stage estimates will result in a
possibly downward bias of the estimates of the variances of ais, thus
providing us with a false sense of precision of the estimates.
Murphy and Topel (1985) provide methods to estimate the variance
of the second stage regression coefficients that accounts for the
stochastic nature of the predicted regressors. We used the method
presented in Murphy and Topel’s theorem 2 to estimate the
variance–covariance matrix of ais in equation (2).
5 While this
approach is not likely to affect the magnitude and sign of the
estimated coefficients, it is likely to have a significant impact on
hypothesis tests regarding ais.
The instrument we use for civwar (ethnwgur) is the one-period
lead of predicted probability of civil war (ethnic war) ( pciwartþ1.
pethnwgurtþ1) in a period. Following the civil war literature, we
make the predicted probability of civil war ( pcivwar, pethnwgur) a
function of civil liberties (civ), primary export dependency
5 Since we cannot claim that the error terms from the two equations are
independent, we used the formula based on Murphy and Topel’s theorem (2) to
estimate the variance–covariance matrix, S*. Suppose the income growth
equation is given as _y ¼ hðX;a; gðW;bÞÞ and the probability of civil war
incidence is given by g^ ¼ gðW;bÞ; then the variance–covariance matrix of a^;
the second-stage coefficient estimates, is given as:
X^
p ¼ s^ 2Va þ Vb½CVbC0 2 CVbR0 2 RVbC0Vb ð5Þ
where
P
* is the variance–covariance matrix of a^ corrected for the stochastic
regressor pcivwartþ1, s^2Va is the uncorrected variance a, Vb is the inverse of the
square of the gradient of the observation matrix with respect to
pseudoregressors evaluated at the true parameter values, V b is the variance
of b from the first-stage regression, C ¼ n plim n21Pni¼1X0i 1^2i ð›ðXi;




i 1^ið›gðWi;bÞ=›b0Þ and b is the coefficient
estimate from the first-stage regression.
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( primary), legislative effectiveness (legeffct) and ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation (elf ). Because the instrument is a predicted
value, it is highly correlated with the incidence of civil war.
However, because it is the future value of the probability of the
incidence of civil war, it is not correlated with the error term of
the growth equation in the current period. This makes it a ‘good’
instrument for civil war incidence. We use a Hausman specification
test to test to see if the IV and DPD98 estimates are the same as
estimates using current year values to measure civil war in a FE
model.
4. Data
The dependent variable in this study is the growth rate of real per
capita income ð_yÞ: We respectively measure this variable as the
annual growth rates of real per capita GDP and real per capita GNP
in 1987 constant PPP dollars. The explanatory variables are the
initial level of per capita income (y0), investment/GDP ratio (k),
education (edu), openness of the economy (trgdp), government
consumption (govcon) and the incidence of civil war. y0 is real per
capita income in 1987 PPP dollars at the beginning of the period. For
example, y0 for the 1960–4 period is the per capita income for 1960.
We follow earlier researchers (Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1991;
Barro and Lee, 1996; Sachs and Warner, 1997) and measure k as the
investment/GDP ratio, while govcon is government consumption/
GDP ratio. We measure edu as the average years of education
attained by the population that is 25 years or older in a country, and
trgdp as the ratio of total trade (exports þ imports) to GDP. legeffct is a
measure of the effectiveness of a country’s legislature while elf is the
probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country
belong to different ethnic groups. civ is Gastil’s civil liberties index
as transformed by Barro into a 1–0 scale. It is measured as:
civ ¼ ð72 civillibertyÞ=6:primary is the primary commodity exports/
GDP ratio.
The variable of major interest in this study is the incidence of civil
war. It is hard to measure what constitutes a civil war since several
different conflicts could conceivably be classified thus. Yet a
distinction between major armed conflicts involving the central
government and an organised army and a minor conflict that
involves few people over a relatively short period of time has to be
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made because they have different economic growth rate impli-
cations. Because our concern is with the growth impact of civil war,
we focus on major conflicts. We admit that the criteria for
determining what constitutes a major conflict is bound to be an
arbitrary one.
We adopt Elbadawi and Sambanis’s (2000, 2002) definition of civil
war incidence in this study. The incidence of civil war in any period
is the sum of two probabilities; the probability that a civil war starts
in a period given that there was no civil war at the beginning of the
period and the probability of observing a civil war in a period given
that there was a war in the previous period. This definition of civil
war incidence therefore encompasses the onset as well as the
duration of the civil war. Several studies indicate that the causes of
civil war initiation and duration are different (see, e.g., Feron, 2001).
Measuring civil war incidence as the combination of initiation and
duration may be problematic if we were interested in the causes of
civil war. However, this paper is concerned with the effects of civil
war incidence (both initiation and duration) on economic growth.
For the purposes of this paper, therefore; not making the distinction
between initiation and duration of civil war should not adversely
affect our central analysis. Our definition of civil war incidence,
however, does not allow for the severity of civil war. It treats a civil
war with 100 casualties annually the same as one with 10,000
casualties annually. We believe that the intensity of a civil war will
have an impact on the growth rate of an economy quite apart from
the growth effect of the incidence. We therefore estimate the effects
of the severity and the incidence of civil war separately.
We use two different measures, civwar and ethnwgur, to measure
the incidence of civil war. civwar is derived from Singer’s Correlates
of War Project (Singer). Singer defines an armed conflict as a civil war
if it meets four criteria: (i) major battle ensued entirely within the
borders of a country: (ii) the government is a major combatant; (iii)
effective resistance occurred on both sides; and (iv) at least 1,000
fatalities occurred during the course of the war. There were a total of
13 countries that had civil wars in at least one year during the
sample period.6 ethnwgur is derived from Gurr’s Minorities at Risk
Project (Gurr) and is defined as episodes of violent conflict between
the national government and national, ethnic, religious or other
6 The civil war countries are Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe.
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communal groups which seek major changes in their status through
armed conflict. To be classified as ethnwgur, each side must mobilise
and field at least 1,000 combatants and must have at least 100 war
fatalities annually. Acts unrelated to war, such as government
sponsored mass murders and communal violence do not qualify as
ethnwgur. The fatality threshold is lower for ethnwgur than for civwar.
Fourteen countries had at least one incident of ethnwgur during the
sample period.7
The data used in this study were obtained from a variety of
sources. Data on y0, _y; k, trgdp, and gov were obtained from the
World Bank (2000). Data for elf, legef fct, and civ were obtained from
R. Bates’ African Research Project at Harvard University. The data
were downloaded from the project’s website at http://africa.gov.
harvard.edu/research.bates, while the data for edu were obtained
from Barro and Lee (2000).
The data for calculating of primary were obtained from various
issues of United Nations’ Statistical Yearbook. Data on civwar and the
average number of war casualties (avdeaths) were obtained from
Singer. Data for ethnwgur was obtained from Gurr
The data are for the 1960–96 period and cover 43 SSA countries.8
To reduce noise in the data and also to reduce the effects of business
cycles, we took five year period averages of the data, giving us
potentially eight observations for each country.9 However, we did
not have complete information for all countries for all periods. Thus
we had an unbalanced panel of 220 observations for the 1960–96
period. Of the 43 countries in the sample, 13 experienced at least one
period of civil war and 14 countries had at least one period of ethnic
war for a total of 44 period-civwar and 46 period-ethnwgurs
respectively out of a total of 220 country-periods10. An advantage
of using the five-year averages of the variables is that it allows
7 The ethnic war countries are Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire
and Zimbabwe.
8 Sample countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
9 The last period covers two years.
10 The list of civil wars in the sample and their duration are presented in Table A1.
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the growth impact of civil war incidence not to be limited only to the
period of actual fighting. We coded civwar as being equal to unity in
any period even if there was a war for only three months out of the
five-year period. Since the average civil war lasted 1.23 months per
country/year, the five-year averages allow the growth impact of a
civil war incidence to be spread over a reasonable period around the
time the civil war is actually fought.
Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 2. The
average annual growth rate of real per capita income in the sample
countries over the 1960–96 period is 0.502%, with most of the
growth occurring in the 1960s. The probability of a civil war (ethnic
war) incidence in a period in a country in the sample period is 0.213
(0.1269), with the average duration of civil war during the year of
1.23 months for all country/years. However, conditional on the
incidence of civil war in a country, the average duration of civil war
was 125 months, an average duration that is similar to those
calculated by Fearon (2001) and others. Although the average
duration of conflict tended to be short, average fatalities of civil
Table 2: Summary statistics of sample data
Variable Meana Standard error Minimum Maximum
_y (%) 0.502 5.072 –17.782 12.913
y (87 PPP$) 1086 874.44 267.4 6159.33
govcon (%) 22.78 8.17 3.46 49.97
k (%) 10.16 7.42 1.133 43.44
months 1.23 3.44 0.00 12
civwar 0.213 – 0.0 1.0
avdeaths 964.06 4171.89 0.0 39963
edu 2.08 1.228 0.276 5.57
trgdp (%) 67.131 33.8797 6.32 164.150
civ 0.3104 0.2179 0.0 0.833
legef fct 1.078 0.693 0.0 3.0
ethnwgur 0.1269 – 0.0 1.0
avemags 0.319 0.835 0.0 3.80
N ¼ 220
a Unweighted averages.
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wars tended to be relatively high, at 964 per incidence of civil war.
One striking feature of the data is the wide variation in all the
variables, as evidenced by the large standard errors and extremely
wide ranges in the variables.
5. Results
We used an IV estimator and the DPD98 estimator to estimate the
growth equation, instrumenting for civwar (ethnwgur) with the one
period forward predicted value of that variable ( pcivwartþ1,
pethnwgurtþ1). In the IV estimates, we used a logit equation to
obtain the predicted value of civwar.11 The logit equation correctly
predicted 86% (93%) of all pairs of civil war (ethnic war) incidence
in the sample while the likelihood ratio test to test the null
hypothesis that all slope coefficients in the logit equation are jointly
equal to zero produced x2-statistics of 135.832 and 148.928 for the
pcivwar and pethnwgur equations respectively. With four degrees of
freedom, we reject the null at a ¼ 0:01: The correlation between
pcivwartþ1 ( pethnwgurtþ l) and civwar (ethnwgur) is 0.62 (0.73).
Before presenting and discussing the estimates of the growth
equation, we discuss the results of a test of exogeneity of civwar
(ethnwgur) in the income growth rate equation. For the IV
estimates, the test is based on a method discussed in Wooldridge
(2002). We estimated the probability of civil war incidence in a
year as a function of civ, primary, lege f f, elf and all other
regressors in (2) and obtained a calculated error term from that
equation, v^2: This error term is then included as a regressor in the
growth equation which uses civwar (ethnwgur) as our measure of
the incidence of civil war. The coefficient of v^2 in this expanded
growth equation is 0.0621 (0.0432) with a calculated ‘t’-statistic of
1.9872 (2.062) for civwar (ethnwgur). This suggests that civwar
(ethnwgur) is endogenous in the growth equation and should be
treated as such. For the DPD98 estimates, Hausman statistic to
test the null hypothesis that all regressors are strictly exogenous
produced x2-statistics of 63.84 (87.59) and 81.28 (89.29) for pcivwar
and ethnwgur respectively. This is consistent with the results of
the exogeneity test for the IV estimates and suggests that the IV
and DPD98 estimators are appropriate estimators for
11 Estimates of the logit equation for civwar are presented in the Appendix and
Table A2
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the estimation of the growth equation in (2). For comparison
purposes, we present FE estimates of the growth equation
together with the IV and DPD98 estimates.
5.1. Civil War Incidence
We present and discuss the growth effect of civil war incidence in
the first subsection while the second subsection discusses the
growth effect of the severity of civil war. The first subsection also
discusses one of several possible growth transmission mechanisms
of civil war incidence. In both subsections, we discuss the growth
effect of civil war on per capita GDP, as well as the growth effect on
per capita GNP, to ensure that our results do not depend on the
measure of income we use. We also present estimates based on
civwar and ethnwgur to test whether our results are robust to the
measure of civil war.
Growth Effects of Civil War
Coefficient estimates of the growth rate equation with civwar as an
added regressor are presented in Tables 3–6. Tables 3 and 5
present the estimates of the growth rate of per capita GDP, while
Tables 4 and 6 present the estimates for the growth rate of GNP
per capita. Column 2 presents FE estimates of the growth
equation with civwar as a regressor (for comparison with the IV
and DPD98 estimates), columns 3 and 4 present the IV estimates,
while column 5 presents the DPD98 estimates. The regression
statistics in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the growth rate equation
(2) fits the data relatively well. The equation explains about 40%
(20%) of the variation in the growth rate of per capita GDP (GNP)
in SSA during the sample period. We reject the null hypothesis
that all slope coefficient estimates are jointly equal to zero at a ¼
0:01 as indicated by the F-statistics and the x2-statistic of joint
significance. In addition, all coefficient estimates are of the
expected signs and most of them are significantly different from
zero at reasonable confidence levels. The coefficients of all time
dummies (not reported) are negative and significant at a ¼ 0:05 or
better, suggesting that the growth rate of income declined
consistently during the sample period.
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Table 3: Coefficient Estimates of GDP Growth Equation, 1960–96: CIVWAR
Coefficient estimates
Variable FE IV1 IV2 DPD98
k 0.3007 (6.08)a 0.4577 (5.84) 0.4541 (5.828) 0.3249 (4.52)
govcon –0.1661 (3.68) –0.0295 (1.87) –0.0399 (2.481) –0.0462 (3.01)
edu 0.1116 (1.80) 0.1789 (3.98) 0.2085 (2.66) 0.2584 (2.29)
trgdp 0.0186 (2.60) 0.0089 (2.69) 0.0128 (2.736) 0.0499 (2.89)
y0 –0.1339 (1.67) –0.1152 (2.05) –0.0938 (1.938) –0.0021 (2.06)
civwar –1.0127 (1.97) – –0.9867 (1.223) –
pcivwartþ1 – –7.4201 (10.629) –8.3437 (4.819) –4.4592 (3.506)
N 220 220 220 220
F 41.65 47.06 47.105
R2 0.4209 0.4338 0.4329
Jt. test of significance 71.744 [6]
b
Jt. test for Time Dums. 51.912 [6]
Sargan Test 11.314 [11]
First order ser. corr. 0.207 [44]
Hausman m 63.84 [6]
a Absolute value of asymptotic ‘t’-statistics computed from heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.



















Table 4: Coefficient Estimates of GNP Growth Equation, 1960–96: CIVWAR
Coefficient estimates
Variable FE IV1 IV2 DPD98
k 0.4564 (6.08)a 0.5281 (6.218) 0.5272 (6.429) 0.5131 (6.13)
govcon –0.2455 (3.18) –0.1398 (3.01) –0.1434 (2.829) –0.0921 (2.64)
edu 0.1622 (2.81) 0.1536 (4.49) 0.2082 (4.217) 0.1871 (3.28)
trgdp 0.0115 (2.95) 0.0259 (2.16) 0.0275 (2.235) 0.0369 (2.89)
y0 0.0019 (1.47) –0.0021 (1.90) –0.0021 (2.504) –0.0018 (2.48)
civwar –2.0126 (1.80) – –0.9664 (0.642) –
pcivwartþ1 – –8.5640 (7.385) –9.6821 (6.992) –7.8921 (7.09)
N 220 220 220 220
F 16.30 24.42 24.68
R2 0.2420 0.2787 0.2801
Jt. test of significance 69.281 [6]b
Jt. test for time dums. 67.471 [6]
Sargan test 13.219 [11]
First order ser. corr. 0.318 [44]
Hausman m 87.59 [6]
a Absolute value of asymptotic ‘t’-statistics computed from heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
























Table 5: Coefficient Estimates of GDP Growth Equation, 1960–96: ETHNWGUR
Coefficient estimates
Variable FE IV1 IV2 DPD98
K 0.3772 (4.61)a 0.3929 (4.404) 0.3907 (4.186) 0.2284 (4.623)
govcon –0.1864 (2.20) –0.1700 (2.71) –0.1809 (2.13) –0.0318 (1.79)
edu 0.1560 (1.62) 0.1628 (2.88) 0.1202 (1.86) 0.3954 (2.14)
trgdp 0.0323 (2.37) 0.0322 (2.34) 0.0281 (2.16) 0.0559 (2.49)
Y0 –0.0155 (1.96) –0.1337 (1.871) –0.1423 (1.789) –0.0011 (1.98)
ethnwgur –4.0515 (2.36) – –3.0414 (1.44) –
pethnwgurtþ1 – –5.8948 (5.863) –2.9315 (3.493) –5.6188 (3.106)
N 220 220 220 220
F 17.29 19.89 19.98
R2 0.1475 0.1692 0.1699
Jt. test of significance 87.023 [6]b
Jt. test for time dums. 56.363 [6]
Sargan test 11.58 [11]
First order ser. corr. 0.249 [44]
Hausman m 81.28 [6]
a Absolute value of asymptotic ‘t’-statistics computed from heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.



















Table 6: Coefficient Estimates Of Gnp Growth Equation, 1960–1996: Ethnwgur
Coefficient estimates
Variable FE IV1 IV2 DPD98
K 0.5000 (6.61)a 0.5309 (6.714) 0.5301 (6.217) 0.4424 (5.138)
Govcon –0.2477 (3.20) –0.2323 (3.03) –0.2352 (3.05) –0.1344 (2.56)
Edu 0.1454 (1.84) 0.1734 (2.18) 0.1703 (2.17) 0.3452 (1.98)
Trgdp 0.0111 (1.61) 0.0042 (2.19) 0.0031 (2.14) 0.0826 (2.66)
y0 0.0002 (1.69) –0.0038 (2.26) –0.0004 (2.29) –0.0035 (1.68)
ethnwgur –2.9410 (1.87) – –0.7778 (0.42) –
pethnwgurtþ1 – –6.9366 (4.674) –6.1787 (3.782) –5.1768 (3.14)
N 220 220 220 220
F 16.30 18.78 18.30
R2 0.1990 0.2432 0.2376
Jt. test of significance 91.936 [6]b
Jt. Test for Time dums. 29.28 [6]
Sargan test 16.64 [11]
First order ser. corr. 0.365 [44]
Hausman m 89.29 [6]
a Absolute value of asymptotic ‘t’-statistics computed from heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
























The coefficients of k, edu, and trgdp in columns 2–5 in Table 3 are
positive and significantly different from zero as a ¼ 0:05 or better.12
This suggests that investment rate, openness of an economy and
education have positive and significant effects on the growth rate of
per capita GDP in SSA countries. The coefficient of govcon in
columns 2–5 is negative and significant at a ¼ 0:05 or better,
suggesting that government consumption decreases the growth rate
of per capita GDP in SSA countries, all things equal. The coefficient
of y0 is negative and significant, suggesting that conditional
convergence operates in SSA countries. These coefficient estimates
are in accord with our expectations and are similar to the results of
earlier research.
The coefficient, of civwar in column 2 of Table 3 is negative and
significantly different from zero at a ¼ 0:05; suggesting that the
incidence of civil war has a negative and statistically significant
effect on the growth rate of GDP per capita. This negative coefficient
is consistent with the results of earlier research that finds a negative
relationship between civil war incidence and income growth rate
(e.g., Barro, 1991; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997;
Murdoch and Sandler, 2001; Atardi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). It is
also consistent with the results of research that find that ethnic
tensions and strife decrease the growth rate of income in African
countries (Rodrik, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Gyimah-Brem-
pong and Traynor, 1999; Temple, 1999).
In column 3, we replace civwar with its instrument, pcivwartþ1.
The coefficient of pcivwartþ1 is negative, relatively large and
significantly different from zero at any reasonable degree of
confidence, suggesting that the probability of civil war has a
large, negative and statistically significant effect on the growth rate
of per capita GDP, all things equal. Moreover, the inclusion of
pcivwartþ1 does not qualitatively change the coefficient estimates on
other regressors. This suggests that the probability of a civil war has
a large negative effect on the growth rate of income that is
independent of the effects of other regressors. In column 4, we
include both civwar and pcivwartþ1 as regressors. The coefficients of
k, edu, trgdp, govcon and y0 are as expected, and most of them are
significantly different from zero at 5% confidence level or better. The
coefficient of civwar is negative but not significant at a ¼ 0:10; while
12 Where we postulate an expected sign, we test the hypothesis using a one-tailed
test, otherwise we use two-tailed tests.
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that of pcivwartþ1 is negative, relatively large and significantly
different from zero at a ¼ 0:01; suggesting that the negative
coefficient of pcivwartþ1 is robust to the inclusion of civwar as a
regressor in the growth of per capita GDP equation while civwar is
not. The insignificance of the coefficient of civwar in column 4 is not
surprising given its correlation with pcivwartþ1. The IV estimates
suggest that a one unit increase in civil war incidence decreases the
growth rate of per capita GDP by between 7 and 8 percentage
points, all things being equal. This is a very large growth effect
compared to the FE estimate in column 2.
In the presence of dynamics and endogenous regressors, some
researchers (e.g., Caselli et al., 1996) argue that the DPD estimator
produces consistent estimates while other panel estimators do not.
Besides, it is possible that other regressors besides civwar (e.g., k) are
also endogenous regressors in the income growth equation, thus
making the IV estimates inconsistent and biased.
The DPD estimator is an IV GMM estimator that can account for
the endogeneity of several regressors at the same time, hence it is
appropriate when there are more than one endogenous regressor, as
in growth equations. To check whether our results depend on which
IV estimator is used, we used the DPD98 estimator to estimate the
growth equation. A key assumption for the DPD98 estimator to
produce consistent estimates is lack of autocorrelated error terms.
We test for the absence of autocorrelated errors. We estimated the
equation in first differences, using pcivwartþ1 and lagged levels of
other variables as additional instruments. We included time
dummy variables as regressors. The DPD98 estimates are presented
in column 5 of Tables 3 and 5. Test statistics indicate that there is no
evidence of first order serial correlation. The Sargan test statistic
indicates that the model is well specified and does not reject the
over-identification restrictions, while the Hausman test statistic
rejects the null hypothesis that all regressors are strictly exogenous.
The test statistics suggest that the DPD98 estimator is an
appropriate estimator for the growth equation in (2).
The estimates in column 5 of Table 3 are all of the expected signs
and significantly different from zero at a ¼ 0:10 or better. In
particular, the coefficient of pcivwart þ l is negative, relatively large
and significantly different from zero at a ¼ 0:01; indicating that the
incidence of civil war has a negative and significant impact on the
growth rate of per capita GDP. Moreover, the DPD98 estimates are
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closer in absolute magnitude and precision to the IV estimates in
columns 3 and 4 than they are to the FE estimates in column 2. A
comparison of the IV and DPD98 estimates suggests that our results
stand whether we use the IV estimator or the DPD98 estimator to
estimate the growth equation in (2).
The coefficient estimates in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that civil war
has a negative and statistically significant effect on the growth rate
of per capita income. The basic results stand whether we use civwar
or pcivwartþ1 as our measure of the incidence of civil war. However,
there are both qualitative and quantitative differences between the FE
estimates and the IV (DPD98) estimates. Generally, the coefficient
estimate of pcivwartþ1 in the IV and DPD98 estimates is about 4–5
times as large as the FE estimate. While the FE coefficient of civwar
suggests that a unit increase in civil war incidence decreases the
growth rate of per capita GDP by about 1%, the estimates in
columns 3–5 suggest that a unit increase in civil war incidence
decreases the growth rate of income by 7–9%. This is a very large
difference. Moreover, the IV and the DPD98 estimates are more
precisely estimated than the FE estimates. A Hausman test to test
the null hypothesis of the equality of the FE and the IV estimates
produced a x2-statistic of 58.629 (63.897), and that between the
DPD98 estimates and their FE counterparts is 61.893. With six
degrees of freedom, we reject the null hypothesis at a ¼ 0:01:
The large absolute difference between the FE estimate and its IV
counterpart in columns 3 and 4 suggests that the correlation
between the error term of the growth equation and the incidence of
civil war imparts a downward bias (towards 0) to the FE estimate of
the effect of civil war on the growth rate of per capita income. On the
other hand, the coefficient of the instrument ( pcivwart þ l) is not so
greatly affected. An alternative way to interpret the differential
growth effect of civwar and pcivwartþ1 is that civwar accounts only
for the growth impact of the incidence of civil war while pcivwartþ1
accounts for the growth impact of the incidence of civil war as well
as factors that cause civil war and may depress growth rate of
income. This suggests that failure to account for the endogeneity of
civil war incidence leads to serious downward bias of the impact
that civil war has on the growth rate of income. Therefore the FE is
not the appropriate estimator for the growth rate equation. All
discussions of our results will therefore be based on the IV and DPD
estimates.
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Do our estimates depend on the income measure used? Table 4
presents the estimates for the growth rate of per capita GNP. The
ordering of the presentation of the estimates in Table 4 are similar to
their counterparts in Table 3. Regression statistics indicate that our
model fits the data on the growth of income in SSA reasonably well.
We reject the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are jointly
equal to zero at a ¼ 0:01: The coefficient estimates in Table 4 are
qualitatively similar to the estimates in Table 3. In particular, the
coefficients of civwar and pcivwartþ1 are negative and significantly
different from zero at a ¼ 0:05 or better in columns 2–5 in Table 4.
The order of magnitude of the coefficients of civwar and pcivwartþ1
in columns 2–5 in both Tables 3 and 4 are very similar—the
coefficient of the instrument of civwar in columns 3–5 of Table 4 is
about 4–5 times as large in absolute magnitude as the estimate for
civwar in column 2 of that table. In column 4, the coefficient of civwar
is negative but insignificant while that of pcivwartþ1 is negative,
relatively large and significantly different from zero.
The estimates presented in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that civil war
incidence has a negative effect on the growth rate of income. It is
possible that our result is dependent on the measure of civil war we
use. To test this possibility, we re-estimated the growth equation
with ethnwgur as our measure of the incidence of civil war. The
results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 presents the
estimates of the per capita GDP growth rate while Table 6 presents
the estimates for the per capita GNP growth rate. As in Tables 3 and
4, column 2 presents the FE estimates, columns 3 and 4 present the
IV estimates while column 5 presents the DPD98 estimates. All
coefficient estimates are of the expected signs and most of them are
precisely estimated. In particular, the coefficients of ethnwgur and
pethnwgurtþ1 are negative and significantly different from zero,
indicating that ethnic war has a negative and statistically significant
impact on the growth rate of income.
As in Tables 3 and 4, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of
pethnwgurtþ1 is significantly larger, and more precisely estimated,
than the FE coefficient of ethnwgur in both sets of income growth
equations, suggesting that the FE estimate is biased downwards.
Robustness test for the coefficient of ethnwgur produced the same
results as that for the coefficient of civwar. Also, estimating the
growth equation with both pethnwgurtþ1 and ethnwgur renders the
coefficient of the latter variable insignificant. Hausman tests to test
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the null hypothesis that the estimates in column 2 are equal to those
in columns 3, 4, and 5 produced x2-statistics of 79.512, 69.821 and
68.913 respectively, leading us to reject the null in all cases. These
exercises confirm our result from Table 3. We note that the growth
impact of civwar is larger than the growth impact of ethnwgur. This
may be a reflection of the fact that during the sample period, civwars
in African countries lasted longer, involved a larger number of
combatants and had more war casualties than ethnwgurs.
How robust is the coefficient estimate of civwar in the income
growth rate equation presented in Tables 3–6? We conducted some
robustness tests by including additional regressors in the growth
rate equation to see what happens to the coefficient of civwar. We
added elf to the growth rate of per capita GDP equation and
re-estimated the equation. This rendered the coefficient of civwar
insignificant. Adding primary, instead of elf, to the equation
produced similar results.13 This suggests that the coefficient of
civwar in the growth rate equation is not robust. The basic results are
also unaffected whether we measure income as per capita GDP or
per capita GNP.14
The growth impact of civil war incidence we find in this paper
appears small in absolute magnitude. It is, however, relatively large.
On average, countries that had civil war in our sample grew at an
annual rate of 0.5% during the sample period compared with 1.16%
for those that did not experience civil war. These growth rates are
very low compared with income growth rates of countries at similar
stages of development in other parts of the world. United Nations
data indicate that the average annual growth rate of per capita
income between 1975 and 2000 for all developing countries was
2.4% while the average per capita income growth rate in SSA during
the same period was 20.9% (UNDP, 2002). The 4–9 percentage
point growth impact of civil war incidence we find in this study is
very large relative to these average growth rates. Most SSA
countries, whether they experienced civil wars or not, pursued
bad economic policies during the sample period, accounting for the
poor economic performance. The only SSA country that pursued
good policies during the sample period—Botswana—(which also
13 We do not present these estimates for space considerations. They are available
upon request.
14 Since pcivwartþ1 is derived from these variables, we do not conduct this test for
pcivwartþ1.
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did not experience a civil war) grew at an average annual rate of
5.1% between 1975 and 2000, compared with the SSA average
of20.9% during the same period. We also note that the growth rate
of Botswana compares favourably with the growth rate of other
developing countries outside SSA. Given the already poor economic
performance due to bad policies, the incidence of a civil war can
only make a desperate situation marginally worse. This may
account for the small absolute growth effect of civil war incidence
we find in this study.
Transmission Mechanism
Our estimates suggest that civil war has a negative and statistically
significant effect on the growth rate of income. It does not, however,
indicate the mechanisms through which this effect occurs. We
mentioned above that civil war can negatively affect economic
growth through several mechanisms, including reduced investment
in both physical and human capital. Though our paper does not
delve into the transmission mechanisms, we briefly investigate the
physical capital investment mechanism. We do so by estimating a
simple accelerator model of investment with civil war incidence as
an added regressor. In addition to the growth rate of income,
investment is likely to be positively impacted by openness of an
economy since investors in open economies may have access to new
technologies and more sources of investment funding than their
counterparts in closed economies. Investment is also likely to be
negatively correlated with government consumption on account of
crowding out effect of government consumption.
We regress investment rate (k) on the one-period lag growth rate
of per capita income ð_yt21Þ; civwar, govcon and trgdp. The investment
equation we estimate is given as:
k ¼ g0 þ g1 _yt21 þ g2civwar þ g3govcon þ g4trgdp þ m ð3Þ
where m is a stochastic error term and all other variables are as
defined in the text. The coefficients of civwar and govcon are
expected to be negative, while those of _yt21 and trgdp are expected
to be positive. As in the growth equation, we instrument for both
civwar and ethnwgur in the investment equation. Coefficient
estimates of this investment equation are presented in Table 7.
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Column 2 presents the k equation with pcivwartþ1 as the measure
of civil war; while column 3 presents the estimates for the equation
that uses pethnwgurt þ l as the measure of civil war.
The coefficients of _yt21 and trgdp are positive and significantly
different from zero at a ¼ 0:01 while that of govcon is negative and
significant, estimates that are consistent with our expectation. The
positive and significant coefficient estimate of _yt21 suggests that
investment in SSA countries can be partly explained by the
accelerator model. The coefficients of pcivwartþ1 and pethnwgurtþ1
are negative, relatively large and significantly different from zero at
a ¼ 0:05 or better, indicating that civil war has a negative and
significant effect on physical capital formation in SSA countries. The
estimates of the investment equation suggest that one of the several
possible mechanisms through which civil war affects income
growth rate is reduced investment in physical capital.
Civil War Incidence and Income Level
Our tentative conclusion is that civil war has a relatively large,
negative and statistically significant impact on the growth rate of





Govcon –0.1718 (2.571) –0.2386 (3.321)
Trgdp 0.0833 (4.289) 0.0783 (4.018)
civwartþ1 –0.6865 (2.124) –




a Absolute value of asymptotic ‘t’-statistics calculated from heteroskedastic
consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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per capita income in SSA countries. Since our data are five-year
averages, the results can be considered a short-term effect of civil
war on income growth. Does this negative growth effect persist over
longer periods of time? If so, then civil war should have a negative
effect on the level of per capita income. We investigate this issue in a
very simple way by regressing the level of per capita income on civil
war, education and openness of the economy.15 The income level
equation we estimate is given as:
yi ¼ g0 þ g1edui þ g2trgdpi þ g3civwari þ ji ð4Þ
where ji is a stochastic error term and all variables are as defined in
the text above. Since we are interested in the relationship between
income levels and civil war incidence across nations, we estimate a
cross-section regression using the sample period averages of the
variables. There are, therefore, 43 observations for this regression,
which is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Table 8: Estimates of Average Income Level Equation, 1960–96
Coefficient estimates
Variable GDP GNP
edu 0.0964 (4.02)a 0.1263 (4.508) 0.0909 (3.91) 0.1028 (3.897)
trgdp 0.0055 (5.74) 0.1144 (2.908) 0.0052 (5.79) 0.0059 (5.821)
civwar 0.1208 (1.1102) – – –
pcivwartþ1 –0.2096 (1.09) –
ethnwgur 0.1315 (1.468)
pethnwgurtþ1 – –0.2773 (1.287)
N 43 43 43 43
F 26.55 25.95 26.67 27.03
R2 .3663 .3608 .3671 .3742
a Absolute value of ‘t’-statistics in parantheses.
15 Although this is a crude way to investigate the income level–civil war
relationship, it is useful since we are only interested in the correlation
between the two variables. We believe that this simple gravity-type equation
can at least indicate the direction of the relationship.
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The coefficient estimates of the income level equation are
presented in Table 8. Columns 2 and 3 present the estimates for
the GDP per capita equation, while columns 4 and 5 present the
estimates for the per capita GNP equation. The column 2 and 4
estimates are based on the measure of civil war (civwar, ethnwgur),
while columns 3 and 5 present the estimates based on the
instruments of civil war ( pcivwartþ1, pethnwgurtþ1). The equation
explains about 40% of the cross-country variation in income level
and we reject the null hypothesis that all coefficient estimates in the
income level equation are jointly equal to zero at any reasonable
confidence level in all equations. The coefficients of edu and trgdp in
the equation are positive and significant, indicating that education
and openness are positively correlated with the level of income in
SSA countries.
None of the coefficient estimates of the indicators of civil war
(civwar, pcivwartþ1, ethnwgur, pethnwgurtþ1) are significant in the
income level equation, indicating that civil war has no significant
correlation with the level of per capita income. It is possible that
civil war decreases the growth rate of income during and
immediately after the war, but there after, reconstruction leads to
an acceleration of economic growth. This leads to income levels
catching up with those of countries that never had a civil war. While
we are not able to test this conjecture, we use a few examples to
illustrate this point. Nigeria’s economy barely grew in the period
before the Biafran war. Growth rate of the Nigerian economy
averaged about 8% per annum in the decade following the civil war,
after which the economy stagnated. Chad’s economy grew at an
average rate of 5.7% immediately after the 1980–8 civil war, five
times faster than the growth rate before the civil war and the period
after. Similar observations can be made about the growth rate of
GDP in post-conflict Burundi (after 1972 conflict), Mozambique
(after 1994) and Uganda (after 1988). One way to interpret these
results is that, once one accounts for the correlation between income
levels and education and trade policies (factors that are also
correlated with civil war incidence), one does not find a significant
correlation between civil war incidence and the level of income.
It is also possible that civil war incidence, indeed, is significantly
and negatively correlated with the level of income across countries.
However, our methodology and data cannot determine this. This is
especially the case when average per capita incomes in SSA
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countries (both civil war and non-civil war countries) were
decreasing due to economic stagnation and rapid population
growth during the sample period. Perhaps a more sophisticated
methodology and a richer data set could uncover this relationship.
The estimates here are, however, consistent with the results of
earlier cross-country growth research that finds no significant
relationship between income level and the incidence of civil wars. It
is clear that the relationship between the incidence of civil war and
cross-national variation in income levels needs further investi-
gation, an agenda we hope to take on in a different research project.
There is an alternative way to interpret the insignificant
relationship between civil war and the level of per capita income.
It is possible that income growth and therefore long-run income
levels are determined by country heterogeneity not captured by
civil war and that relatively high income countries in our sample
have a lower propensity for civil war incidence. Hence the
insignificant relationship we find between income levels and civil
war incidence in this study says nothing about the long-term effect
of civil war incidence on economic well being. Of course, it is
possible that we have misspecified the relationship between the
level of income and the incidence of civil war.
5.2. Growth Effects of Civil War Intensity
The analysis above has focused on the incidence of civil war, which
ignores the intensity of civil war. A war that lasts a long time and has
more fatalities is likely to have a more deleterious growth effect than
one that lasts for a short period of time with few casualties. We
therefore investigate the effect of civil war severity on the growth
rate of per capita income. The Minorities at Risk data from which we
obtained ethnwgur provide an overall score for the intensity of a civil
war (avemags). This variable is a composite of conflict duration, war
casualties, average number of combatants and portion of the
country geographically covered by the civil war. The scale ranges
from 0 to 4, with 0 implying non-existence of war or no intensity and
4 being the most intense conflict. We re-scaled avemags in the
following way. We created two dummy variables: MAG1,which
takes the value of one if avemags is between 0.2 and 1.5, zero
otherwise to represent moderate severity, and MAG2,which
represents severe civil war intensity and takes the value of unity
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if avemags is greater than 1.5, zero otherwise. We used these dummy
variables to measure the effect of severity of ethnic wars on the
growth rate of per capita income in SSA. The control group are
countries with avemags score of 0.2 or less.
The civwar data did not have a composite variable for the severity
of conflict; it only provides total war casualties for the entire
duration of the conflict. We created two measures of civil war
severity from the civil war data. Our first measure was created as
follows: we took the product of average duration of civil war in a
period (in months) and the average number of war deaths in the
period.16 If the product of war duration and war fatalities is greater
than zero but less than or equal to 15,000 per period, we call it
LOWINT, a dummy variable that equals one, zero otherwise. If the
product is greater than 15,000, we call it HIGHINT and assign a
value of one, zero otherwise. The excluded group are countries
whose product of war duration and war fatalities equal zero. The
second index we created is the normalised first principal com-
ponent formed from the combination of months (the average
duration of civil wars) and the number of war fatalities. Since we
normalise the principal component, it is a z score of civil war
severity, hence it should be interpreted as the number of standard
deviations from the mean of civil war severity. We label this variable
prin1.17
Coefficient estimates of the war intensity equation are presented
in Table 9.18 Columns 2 and 3 present the estimates for civwar, while
column 4 presents the estimates for ethnwgur. The coefficient
estimate of prin1 is negative, relatively large and significantly
different from zero, suggesting that, conditional on civil war
incidence, growth rate of per capita income decreases with the
severity of civil war, all things being equal. A one standard
16 The civwar data gives only total number of war casualties for the entire duration
of the conflict. It is possible that a civil war spans more than one period in our
sample. In such cases, we divide the number of war casualties among the
periods in proportion to the duration of the conflict in each period. Though not
an exact way of counting the number war casualties, this is a more reasonable
approach than any other alternative.
17 We admit that the way we measure civil war intensity is rather crude. However,
given our data, we are not able to provide any refined measure of civil war
intensity. We note that our measure will provide at least an indication of the
effect of civil war intensity on growth.
18 We do not present the full estimates of this equation. We only present the
coefficient estimates of interest.
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deviation increase in the severity of a civil war decreases the growth
rate of per capita income by about 0.8 percentage points in a period.
The interpretation of the coefficient of prin1 is, however, problematic
since there is no unit of measurement. It is not clear what a standard
deviation change in prin1 represents in terms of war intensity. One
cannot therefore use the coefficient estimate to make policy
inference about the effect of any particular variable, such as civil
war fatalities or war duration, on the growth rate of per capita
income. It is, however, indicative of the negative effects civil war
intensity has on the growth rate of income.
Column 3 presents the coefficient estimates of LOWINT and
HIGHINT. Both coefficient estimates are negative and significantly
different from zero at a ¼ 0.10 or better. Moreover, the coefficient of
HIGHINT is larger in absolute magnitude than that of LOWINT,
suggesting that the negative growth effect of civil war increases
with the severity of war. Column 4 presents the estimates for MAG1
and MAG2. The coefficient estimates for both variables are negative
and significantly different from zero suggesting that the severity of
ethnic war has a negative effect on the growth rate of income. The
pattern of these coefficient estimates are similar to those of LOWINT
and HIGHINT in column 3 in the sense that the coefficient estimate
for the high-intensity index is larger in absolute magnitude than
the estimate for the low-intensity index. This suggests that the
growth-reducing effect of ethnic war severity increases at an
increasing rate.
Table 9: Growth Effects of Civil War Intensity, 1960–96
Variable Coefficient Estimates
PRIN1 –0.7817 (2.880)a – –
LOWINT – –1.043 (2.148)
HIGHINT –1.516 (2.192) –
MAG1 – –0.4892 (1.922)
MAG2 – – –0.6305 (1.992)
N 220
a Absolute value of asymptotic ‘t’-statistics calculated from heteroskedastic
consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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5.3. Discussion
Based on the IV and DPD98 estimates presented in Tables 3–6, we
conclude that civil war incidence has a significantly negative and
robust effect on the growth rate of per capita income in SSA
countries. However the civil war-income growth relationship is
robust only if the researcher accounts for possible endogeneity of
civil war incidence. By accounting for the endogeneity of civil war
incidence, we are able to resolve the non-robustness issue noted by
Levine and Renelt (1991). We also find that one of the mechanisms
through which civil war incidence decreases the growth rate of
income is decreased investment in physical capital. In addition, we
show that the severity of civil war has negative and statistically
significant effect on the growth rate of income quite apart from that
of the incidence of civil war. The growth effect of war intensity
increases at an increasing rate with war intensity. The growth
impact of civil war, however, is possibly a short-run phenomenon.
Our results are qualitatively similar to those of Murdock and
Sandler (2002) and Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003). However, there
are some quantitative differences. Our IV and DPD98 estimates of
the growth impact of civil war are much larger in absolute
magnitude than theirs. The growth effects of civil war we estimate
in this study are likely to be lower bound estimates since we do not
account for other possible effects, such as reduced human capital
formation.
Our results have both research and policy implications. From a
research perspective, it is necessary for researchers who use the
incidence of civil war as a regressor in growth equations to account
for the endogeneity of civil war incidence. This can be achieved by
either estimating a structural equation or by using estimation
methodologies that account for the endogeneity of civil war
incidence. Secondly, researchers should distinguish between the
growth effects of civil war incidence and that of the severity of civil
war as they have separate growth effects. Thirdly, researchers
should explore the mechanisms through which civil war affects
income growth.
Given the existence of the stable, robust, negative impact of the
incidence of civil wars on income growth we find in this study, one
way to increase the growth rate of per capita income in African
countries is to reduce the incidence and severity of civil wars there.
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While we do not deal with the causes of the initiation or duration of
civil wars, and hence are not in a position to suggest remedies for
reducing the incidence of civil war, the civil war literature suggest a
few possibilities. These include a concerted effort to reduce the
proliferation of small arms trade, refusal by neighbouring countries
to give sanctuary and material help to insurgents, increasing the
defence capabilities of central governments, as well as increasing
the capabilities to mediate and resolve conflicts. Increasing
economic opportunities for would-be combatants (employment
and schooling and training opportunities for young people and
denying war related benefits for potential war lords’) and increasing
the cost of war to the combatants generally may reduce the
incidence and hence the cost of civil wars. Combatants will not
initiate conflicts or continue to fight if the cost of conflicts exceed
any possible benefits gained. Some of these efforts to reduce the
incidence of civil wars in African countries will involve regional
and international cooperational.
The need to reduce civil wars as a means of spurring economic
growth is especially important in SSA where economic resources are
scarce, the need for rapid economic growth is pressing and civil
wars abound to compound human misery. Although the impact of
civil war on income may be short term in nature, African political
leaders, the international community and other policy makers
interested in improved economic prospects for African countries
should still focus on measures to counter the effects since the short
run could be relatively long. Better still, the policy makers should
focus on avoiding civil wars per se, not only to spur economic growth,
but also to reduce human misery directly caused by civil wars.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigated the effects of the incidence and severity of
civil wars on the growth rate of per capita income and the
robustness of such effects in SSA. Using panel data from a sample of
43 SSA countries for the 1960–96 period and IVand DPD estimators,
we find that the incidence of civil war has a significant negative
effect on the growth rate of per capita income, all things being equal.
However, the robustness of the relationship disappears if one does
not account for the possible endogeneity of civil war. Civil war has a
negative growth effect partly through reduced physical capital
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formation. We also find that the severity of civil war has a negative
effect on the growth rate of per capita income that is different from
the growth effect of civil war incidence. It is therefore necessary to
distinguish between the two factors: the growth effects of the
incidence and of the severity of civil wars. Our results have
implications for growth research and policies to promote economic
growth in SSA.
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Appendix: Logit Estimates of the CIVWAR Instrument
The regressor of interest in this paper is civil war incidence,
instrumented with the one-period lead of the predicted probability
of civil war ( pcivwartþ1). We think of civil war incidence as a latent
variable, propensity for civil war (y*), which can occur in any SSA
country. This latent variable is a continuous function of some
underlying socio-political factors. We write the latent as: yp ¼ Lð
XÞ ¼ X0bþ 1; where X and b are vectors of regressors and
coefficients. However, this latent variable y* is only observed
when a civil war occurs in a country; it is zero otherwise.
The ‘threshold’ equation can be written as:
yi ¼




The conditional mean of the latent variable ypi ; ðEðypi jXiÞ; is given
by the function X0bþ 1: The link function we use for this nonlinear
LðXÞ function is the logit function. The odds-on chances of civil war






1 þ exp PJj¼0bkXik
  ð7Þ
As argued in the paper, the elements of X are the index of civil
liberties (civ), primary export dependency (primary), legislative
effectiveness (legeffct) and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (elf). We
are more interested in the correlation of these variables with civwar
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(ethnwgur) than in the causal relationship between these variables
and civil war incidence. Hence the logit equation should be judged
on its ability to predict the probability of civil war occurrence rather
than on a causal relationship between these variables and the
incidence of civil war.
The logit estimates of the civwar and ethnwgur equations are
presented in Table A2. Column 2 presents the estimates for civwar
while column 3 presents the estimates for ethnwgur. The regression
statistics indicate that the four variables strongly predict the
probability of the incidence of civil war in our sample. The
likelihood ratio statistic rejects the null hypothesis that all slope
coefficients are jointly equal to zero at a ¼ 0:01 or better and each of
the slope coefficients is significantly different from zero at a ¼ 0:05
or better. More important for our paper is that the equation correctly
predicts the probability of civil war (ethnic war) incidence in about
88% (92%) of the cases. This leads us to conclude that our
instruments are ‘strong’ instruments.
Table A1: Civil War Countries: 1960–96
Countrya Years Rebel group
Angola 1975–94 UNITA
Burundi 1972, 1991–3 Hutu, FROLINAT, Other
Chad 1965–88 Various Groups




Sierra Leone 1991–3, 1994–7 RUF
Somalia 1981–95 SSDF, SNM, Various Groups
Sudan 1963–71, 1983–96 AN, SPLM, NDA
Uganda 1980–8, 1989 Various Groups
Zaire 1960–2, 1963–5, 1978 Katanga, Kasai, CNL, AFDL
Zimbabwe 1972–9 ZANU, ZAPU
a Some countries that experienced civil war during the period, such as Liberia, are
not included because of lack of data on economic variables.
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Table A2: Logit Estimates of Civil War Probability
Variable Coefficient Estimatesa
Civ 13.0841*** (18.8926)b 11.8916*** (16.8912)
Primary 1.0036*** (6.1019) 2.1897 (10.6291)
legef fct –0.7304*** (11.7949) –0.9228 (10.8971)
Elf 2.1961*** (6.7617) 3.5971 (10.9221)
N 220
Likelihood ratio 135.8325 [8]c 148.9278 [8]
Score 86.1573 [8] 92.8912 [8]
Wald 51.0106 [8] 59.0982 [8]
Percent concordant 88.2 92.86
Somer’s D 0.826 0.898
***Significantly different from zero at a ¼ 0:01:
a All estimates include time dummy variables.
b x2-statistics in parentheses.
c Degrees of freedom.
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